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Often cited in the popular press are predictions of impending ‘water wars’. Increasing 
water scarcity is often the main rationale for these prophesies. The academic literature 
has largely discounted such forecasts and has focused instead on understanding how 
political disputes, conflicts of interest, and occasional militarized skirmishes, over water 
have culminated. While the study of cooperation over shared water has likewise received 
significant scrutiny, the link to water scarcity has not. Thus, just as scarcity may be an 
impetus for dispute between states, it may likewise be the engine for cooperation. 
Focusing on the cooperative history of international water, epitomized by hundreds of 
documented water agreements, the paper argues that cooperation is most likely when the 
resource is neither abundant (when there is no real impetus for cooperation) nor highly 
scarce (where there is little of the resource to divide among the parties or the degradation 
too costly to manage). Further delving into the analysis of international water agreements, 
the paper demonstrates how negotiation is facilitated when important asymmetries 
ascribed to river riparians are addressed through bargaining strategies and ‘strategic 
interaction,’ such as the use of incentives. 
